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In his early "What is 1\1etaphysics?," Heidegger claims that
the question expressed in the tide of his essay puts the ques-
tioner-us-in question. This "putting us in question" then
moves forward towards, as Heidegger says, the completion of
the transformation of man, understood as subject, into exist-
ence (Dasein).l This complete transformation, fot Heidegget,
as we know from the Introduction to the essay that he added
in 1949, amounts to an overcoming ([Jberwindun~ ofmeta-
physics understood as Platonism or as the mere reversal of
Platonisrn (pM 363/279). At this moment, I think it is still
necessary to take seriously Heidegget's attempt to overcome
metaphysics.2 Heidegger had pointed the way towards the
ovetcoming of metaphysics by calling us to think what he
calls the "Auseinander' of the opening of being itself (pM 369/
284). How are we to translate ioto English this German word
"AuJeinandef'? Perhaps as the "outside of one another" or even
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as the "outside itsel[" No matter what, however, "Auseinandef'
implies that, in order to overcome metaphysics, we must have
a thought of the outside. A thought of the outside would be
a thought that comes from the outside which is as weil a
thought abOl..lt the outside. This outside, it seems to me, how-
ever, is not "the opening of being," as Heidegger says, btlt the
opening of life. Tb.e outside is a place in which life and death
indefinitely delimit one another. But to move us to this place
of delimitation, we must start with a critique of phenomenology.
We must start here because phenomenology has shown
a remarkable resilience across the Twentieth Century. But more
importantly, we n1ust start here because phenomenology has
already conceived life through its central concept of Erlebnis
("lived-experience" in English, "VCft/' in French). Therefore,
we can ask whether phenomenology itself has already initi-
ated an overcoming of metaphysics. Husserl, oE course,
thought so. Yet, certain critiques in France dating from the
1960's imply that lived-experience consists in a kind oE inside-
ness, which is not interna~ and a kind oE sameness, which is
not identity-but lmxture and ambiguity. IE mixture and
ambiguity defme lived-experience, then it follows that some-
times phenomenology restores Platonism, while other times it
merely reverses Platonism into its opposite. Understood in
this way, as sameness and inside-ness, phenomenology does
not overcome metaphysics. Phenomenology is not a thought
of the outside-or, at least, this is what I would like to show
here. IE you heard the allusion in the ph.rase "the thought of
the outside," you know that I am thinkillg of Foucault, in
particular, the critiqtle of phenomenology found in his 1966
vsMots ef fes fhoses. 3 The other critique con1es from Derrida's
1967 La Voix ef le phenomene.4 In any case, what I intend to do
here is reconstruct the critique of phenomenology found in
Foucault and Derrida.5 I am going to start witl1. Foucault, and
in particular, with Chapter Nine of Les Mots et les fhoses, "Mall
alld his Doubles."
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The Analysis of Lived-Experience (vecu) is a
Discourse with a Mixed Nature
Chapter Nine of LeJ MotJ et leJ t'hoJcs, "Man and his
Doubles," contains, of course, Foucault's critique of modern
llumanism.6 The chapter therefore focuses on man (and not
on the human being). Foucault defines man as a double; he is
at once an object of knowledge and a subject that knows (NIC
323/312). ~1an (and again not the human being) is what oc-
cupies, as Foucault says, this "ambiguous position." The en-
tire critique of humanism unfolds, for Foucault, from this
designation of man as "ambiguous," adesignation which re-
calls, of course, ~lerleau-Ponty and Sartre. I shail turn to
Merleau-Ponty in a moment. In any case, for Foucault, the
ambiguity that defmes man consists in two senses of finitude.
In one sense, finitude consists in the empirical positivities, the
empirical contents of "work, life, and language," which tell
man that he is finite (NIC 326/315). The knowledge of life,
for instance, teils man that he is going to die. The other sense
is that this finitude is itself fundamental. The forms of knowl-
edge in which the very contents that tell Ulan that he is finite
are forms whicl~ are themselves finite. For instance, for man,
there is no inteilectual intuition. So, fmitude is ambiguous
between empirical content and foundational forms. For Fou-
cault, this ambiguity of finitude results in an "obligation" to
ascend "up to an analytic of fmitude." Here it is necessary to
hear the word "analytic" in its Kantian sense, as a "theory of
the subject" (MC 330/310). For Foucault, this would be an
analytic "where the being of man will be able to found, in
their positivity, all the forms that indicate to him that he is not
infmite" (MC 326/315, myemphasis). This analytic would be
the discourse oE phenomenology.
The discourse of phenomenology would aim at, accord-
ing to Foucault, a truth that would be neither empirical con-
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tent nor transcendental form, while trying to keep the empiri-
cal and transcendental separated. This is an important quali-
fication-"while trying to keep the empirical and transcen-
dental separated"-since what is at issue is here whether pl1-e-
nomenology can maintain the separation between the empiri-
cal and the transcendental. In any case, according to FOll-
cault, phenomenology would be an analytic of man as a sub-
ject in this precise sense: man as subject, "that is, as the place
of empirical knowledge but led back as close as possible to
what makes empirical knowledge possible, andas the pure form
that is immediately present to these contents." Man as sub-
ject therefore would be the third and intermediary term in
which empiricity and transcendentality would have their roots.
According to Foucault, this third and intermecliary term has
been designated by "Je vetu." "Le vecd' responds to the "obli-
gation" to analyze finitude, that is, to the obligation to have a
theory of the subject. Here is Foucault's definition oE "fe lJeCU':
"lived-experience, in fact, is at once the space where all em-
pirical content is given to experience; it is also the originary
form that luakes them in gel1eral possible." We can now see
the problem with "Je vel'U," and indeed, with "man." "Le veftl'
must be concrete enough in order to he able to apply to it a
descriptive language; yet it must he enough removed from
positivity so that it can provide the foundations for empirical
positivity. The discourse of vel"U tries to make the empirical
hold for the transcendental: the empirical is the transcenden-
tal and the transcendental is the empirical, or, the content is
the form and the form is the content. Lived-experience there-
fore is a mixture. And thllS FOllcault says that "the al1alysis of
lived-experience [lJecu] is a discourse with a mixed nature: it is
addressed to a specific hut ambiguous layer" C1'1C 332/321).
This analytic "mixes" the transcendental and the empirical
together. Therefore, what we have seen so far is that the con-
cept of lived-experience, as Foucault understands it-and this
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is also how Detrida understands it, as we shall see in a mo-
ment-consists not in an identity of empirical content and
foundational form but in a mixture or ambiguity between these
two. Here, howevet, one could plausibly wondet whethet such
a defmition can be found in phenomenology. So, let us turn
now to Hllsserl and then to 1-1erleall-Ponty to confltm this
definition.
Lived-Experience (das Erlebnis, le vecu) in
General
We have been discussing Erlebnis; so, let us turn to
Husserl's classical defmition of Erlebnis in ldeas I, in section
36, which is entitled "Intentional Lived Experiences. Lived
Experiences in General."7 Here, in order to distinguish what
he is doing from psychology, Husserl says, "Rather [than a
discourse of real psychological facts; the word "real" is, of
course, important,] the discourse hete and throughout is about
putely phenomenologicallived-experiences, that is, their es-
sences, and on that basis, what is 'a priori' enclosed in [in
beslfJlossen] their essences with unconditional necessity" (HUA
111:1, p. 80).R As I just said, that I-Iusserl calls psychological
facts "real" is important, because all purely phenomenologi-
cal lived-experiences are "reelle." What Husserl calls inten-
tional lived experiences, thoughts in the broadest sense, are
reelle, which means that thoughts are internal. Yet, intentional
lived experience also contains "the fundamental characteristic
of intentionality," the property of being consciousness of
something. This "of something"-the fundamental charac-
teristic of intentionality-means that lived-experience is re-
lated to an outside; something comes from the outside into
lived-experience. But, Husserl says, "within the concrete unity
of an intentionallived experience," there are reelle moments,
which do not have the fundamental characteristic of inten-
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tionality; these reelle moments are the data of sensation. Here,
Husserl has discovered something non-intentional and there-
fore passive at the very heart of lived-experience, something
that comes from the outside, and yet he has designated these
moments as "reelle," and thereby as "enclosed in" "das
Erlebnis iiberhaupt." By means of this "ii.berhallpt" and this
"in beschlossen," we can conclude already that Erlebnis, in this
classical formulation, consists in a sameness, wruch is not iden-
tity, and an inside-ness which is not sirnply internal; in a word,
ErlebniJ "in general" consists in a mixture.
To demonstrate this sameness and inside-ness again, I
would also like to look at another Husserl text: the fmal ver-
sion of Husserl's 1927 Encyclopedia Britannica entry on "Phe-
nomenology." As is well-known, this text introduces phenom-
enology through phenomenological psychology. Phenomeno-
logical psychology, Husserl says here, has the task of investi-
gating the totality of lived experience. But, more irnportandy,
phenomenological psychology, according to Husserl, is an
easier way to enter into the transcendental problem that oc-
curred historically with Descartes, that is, that all of reality,
and finally the whole world, are for us in existence and in
existence in a certain way only as the represel1tational content
of our own representations. Thus everyth.ing real has to be
related back to uso But this "us" cal1not be the psyche, ac-
cording to Husserl, because the psyche is defined by the mun-
dane sense of being as Vorhandenheit, presence, or, more liter-
ally, presence-at-hand. To use a mundane being-whose on-
tological sense is Vorhandenheit-to account for the reality of
the world-whose ontological sense is also Vorhandenheit-is
circular, and this circularity defmes psychologism.9 In con-
trast to psychologism, phenomenology claims, according to
Husserl, that there is a parallelism between psychological sub-
jectivity and transcendental subjectivity and that this parallel-
ism involves a deceptive appearance (Schein) of "transcenden-
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tal duplication." It is important here, it seems to me, that,
while Husserl recognizes that there is some sort of difference
between the transcendental and the psychological or the em-
pirical, he does not, we might say, partition off the transcen-
dental from the psychological or en~pirical. Instead, he says
that transcendental sllbjectivity is defined by Vorhandenheit tao,
but "not in the same sense" (nitht im selben Sinn vorhanden ist).10
Indeed, Husserl thinks that by saying "not in the same sense,"
he has eliminated the deceptive appearance and makes the
parallelism understandable. This is what he says, "the parallel-
ism of the transcendental and the psychological spheres of
experience has become comprehensible...as a kind of iden-
city of the interpenetration [Ineinande~ of ontological senses."11
This "kind of identity," he also describes as "ambiguity"
(Zweideutigkeit). Here Husserl thinks the "Ineinander," literally,
one in the other, but not, we might say, the ''Auseinander,'' liter-
ally, one outside of the other. Nevertheless, this "Zweideutigkeit'
and "Ineinander' should make us think of Merleau-Ponty. So I
would like to turn now to Merleau-Ponty, and in particular, to
his Phenomenology of Pert'eption. 12
On the very first page of the ]Jhenomenology of ]Jerception,
j\,ferleau-Ponty speaks of IJeCU, and, throughout the ]Jhenom-
enology the word modifies the term "monde," "warld." For ex-
ample, in the chapter called "The Phenomenal Field," 11erleau-
Ponty says that "the fttst philosophical act therefore would be
that of returning to the lived-world on this side of the objec-
tive world" (phP 69/57). Yet, he uses the word as a noun-"le
vel'tI'-only twice. The ftrst time occurs in the chapter called
"Space"; here he says "lived-experience [fe 1Jet'U] is really lived
by me... , but I can live more things that I can think of [plus de
choses queJe m'en representeJ. What is only lived is ambi?Jalent'
(phP 343/296; my emphasis). For Merleau-Ponty, ambivalence
is the crucial characteristic of veeu. And this characteristic
guides his analysis of intersubjectivity in the Phenomenology oj'
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.Perception, which is where he uses "fe vectl' for the second time,
in the chapter called "Others and tl1e Human World." Here
"fe vel'U"is defmed by self-givenness (phP 411/358); but, this
self-givenness is also given (phP 413/360). In other words,
the active is also passive. In this formula we can see the im-
portance of the positive affttmation in the "is." This positive
affttmation is the heart of ambivalence. N ow, these two uses
of "Je 1Jectl' in the ])henomenofogy of ])erlr:ption depend of course
on Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Husserl's concept of
.Fundiert/ng. In the chapter called "The Cogito;' Merleau-Ponty
speaks of the relation between founding (fe fondant) and
founded (fe fonde) as one that is "equivocal" (equivoque), since
"every truth of fact is a truth of reason, every truth of reason
iJ a truth of fact" (phP 451/394; my emphasis).13 Merleau-
Ponty also says that d1.e relation of matter and form is a rela-
tion of J-1undierung. "The form integrates the content to the
point that it appears to end up being a simple mode of the
form ... but reciprocally ... the content remains as a radical
contingency, as the fltst establishment or the foundation of
knowledge and action.... It is trus clialectic of form and con-
tent that we have to restore" (phP 147-48/127). We can now
summarize what we see in Merleau-Ponty's concept of "Ie vel"U."
For Merleau-Ponty, "fe vetil' is ambivalent or equivocal-it is,
we could say, a mixture, un mefange-because the content of
experience, "le sol," as J\Ierleau-Ponty also says, becomes, is
integrated into, the form of expressiol1. Phenomenological
lived experience therefore is not defmed by identity, but by
sameness and mixture of form and content, or of empirical
and transcendental.
"Un Ecart intime, mais invincible"
Both Husserl and the early Merleau-Ponty conceive
ErfebniJ as mixture and ambiguity because both want to over-
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come the duality of subject and ohject, or even the duality of
what Heidegger calls the ontological difference. In other
words, phenomenology is an attempt to overcome Platonism
or Cartesianism (dualisms) by mixing together content and
form. In both Foucault and Derrida, we fmd statements that
assert that the phenomenological concept of ErlebniJmixes in
this way. First we have Foucault's statement in Chapter Seven
of Les Mots et les choses, which is called "The Limits of Repre-
sentation." Foucault says:
Undoubtedly, it is not possible to give empiri-
cal contents transcendental value, or to move
them onto the side of a constituting subjec-
tivity, without giving rise, at least silencly, to an
anthropology, that is, to a mode of thought in
which the in principle limits of knowledge
[t'onnazssance] are at the same time [en meme temps]
the concrete forms of existence, precisely as
they are given in that san'le empirical knowl-
edge [Javoitj. ~1C 261/248, my emphasis)
Evel1. if phenomenology is transcendental, Foucault is saying,
it still falls prey to a "silent anthropology." It takes my present
or ourpresent experiences, which are content, as foundational
forms. In other words, on the basis of the empirical contents
given to me, or, better, to UJ, phenomenology tries to deter-
mine the form of that empirical content. While trying to keep
them separate, phenomenology makes the transcendental and
the empirical the same. It confuses them (MC 352/341). Now,
in the Introductiol1 to LLt Voix et lephinomene, Derrida makes a
very similar statement, hut he adds something that helps us
see the principle of the critique:
Presence has always been and will always be,
to infinity, the form in which-we can say this
apodictically-the infInite diversity of content
will be produced. The opposition-which
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inaugurates metaphysies-between form and
matter fmds in the eonerete ideality of the liv-
ing present its ultimate and radical justifiea-
rion. (VP 5/6)
When Derrida says here that the opposition between form
and content finds its ultimate and radical jllstification, he means
that content, the root of empirieal positivity, and form, the
finality of transcendental foundation, are mixed together in
the living present at the same time. Indeed, in both quotes, we
see that the mixture of subject and objeet in lived-experienee
depends on a temporal sameness: "at the same time" or "si-
multaneity," "en meme temps" or "a la fois." This dependence
on temporal sameness teils us already that a eritique of the
coneept of lived-experienee will eome from a kind of spatial
thirlking and from are-institution of dualisms.
Derrida's eritique ean be seen most elearly in chapter six
of La Vozx et le phenomene, entided "The Voiee that Keeps Si-
lent." As is weil-known, Derrida's eritique centers on the eOll-
eept of presenee. So here is the definitioll of presence that
Derrida provides in Chapter Six:
presence (is] simultaneouslJ [a laibis] . 0 • the being--
b~fore ~fo the obJoett, available for a look
and.. .proximi!J to se!! in interiori!y. The "pre"
oE the present objeet now-beEore is an against
[tontre] (Gegenwart, Gegenstand) simultaneously
[a laftis] in the sense of the whol!J against [tout-
tontre] oE proximity and in the sense of the
entounter [l'entontre] of the op-posed. (VP 83-
84/75; Derrida's italies)
Presenee, as Derrida understands it, is Cl la ibis elose by and
proximate, and a la ibis away and distant. In other words, it
must be "at the same time" self-presenee and presence, the
object as repeatable to infinity and the presence of the eonsti-
tuting acts to themselves. For Derrida, this ambiguity between
presence of an objeet and self-presenee of a subjeet is found
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in the voice of interior monologue, in other words, hearing
oneself speak. The primary characteristic of this "absolutely
unique type of auto-affection" (VP 88/78) is ten1porality.
When I speak to myself silently, the sound is iterated across
moments. This temporal iteration is why, as Derrida explains,
sOllnd is the most ideal of all signs (VP 86/77). Thlls, in
hearing-oneself-speak, one still exteriorizes one's thoughts or
"meaning-intention" or acts of repetition in the iterated and
iterable phonemes. This exteriorization-expression-seems
to imply that we have now moved from time to space. But,
since the sound is heard by the subject during the time he is
speaking, the voice is in absolute proximity to its speaker,
"within the absolute proximity of its present" (VP 85/76),
"absolutely elose to me" (VP 87/77). The sllbject lets him-
self be affected by the phoneme (that is, he hears his own
sounds, ms own voice, "la voix propre") without any detour
through exteriority or through the world, or, as Derrida says,
without any detour through "the non-proper in general" (Vp
88/78). Hearing-oneself-speak is "lived [vecue] as absolutely
pure auto-affeetion" (VP 89/79). What makes it be a pure
auto-affeetion, according to Derrida, is that it is "a self-prox-
imity which would be nothing other than the absolute reduc-
tion of spaee in general" (VP 89/79). Yet-and this is a cru-
cial "yet"-there is a double here between hearing and speak-
ing. As Derrida says, this pure auto-affection, which is the
very root of transcendental Erlebnis, supposes that "a pure
difference...divides the presence to oneself" (VP 92/82). Tms
difference divides the "auto." As Derrida says, "It produces
the same as the self-relation within the differenee with one-
self, the same as the non-identical" (VP 92/82). Being non-
identical, auto-affection is ambiguous. We rnust understand
the non-identity, however, in the following way: when I hear
myself speak, the hearing is arepetition of the speaking that
has already disappeared; re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigun~has
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Ftervened, and that intervention means, in a word, space. As
IDerrida says, "the 'outside' insinuates itself in the movement
Ihy which the inside of non-space, what has the name of 'time,'
appears to itself, constitutes itself, 'presents' itself" (VP 96/
86). Within time, there is a fundamental "spacing" (ejpacemen~
(VP 96/86).14 Derrida also calls this spacing "un ecart' within
"Je fJeed' (VP 77/69). On the basis of Derrida's use of the
word "el'art," we can rejoin Foucault.
In UJMotJ et leJ t'hoJeJ, Foucault says that all of the doubles
in which man consists are based on "un ecart i~fime, maiJ invin-
cihle"; the English translation says, a "hiatus, miniscule and yet
invincible" C1'IC 351/340). Here we can dissociate an ambi-
guity in the word "in:fime." This "Cl'art' is "infime," that is,
miniJcule; insofar as it is miniscule, the "et'arf' closes and relates
"in the manner of "a mixed nature." But, this "ecarf' is also
"injime," in the sense of infinitesimal, infmitely divisible, and
thus a great distance that separates and keeps open. It seems
to me tl~at this ecart i~ftme sets up all the problems that are
ours. In fact, I think it is impossible to over-estimate the im-
portance of chapter nine in Lej' Motj' et lej' thosej', "Man and his
Doubles." Foucault says here, after mel1tioning this miniscule
hiatus, that:
[In conttast to classical thought, in which time
founds space], in modern thought, what is re-
vealed at the foundation oE the history of
things and of the historicity proper to man is
the distance hollowing out the Same, it is the
hiatus [ecar~ that disperses the Same and gath-
ers it back at the two edges of itselE It is this
profound spatiality that allows modern
thought still to think time-to know it as suc-
cession, to promise it as completion, origin or
return. (MC 351/340)
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It seems to me, if I may extend the analysis a bit, that we must
see this "profound spatiality" working, as weIl, in Deleuze's
critique of phenomenology found both in his 1968 DiJferen(/c
and Repetition15 and in his 1969 Logü' of SenJc. 16 For Deleuze,
the phenomenological concept of Urdoxa, wmch one fmds in
both Hllsserl and in Merleau-Ponty, is not originary, since it is
always "copied off"-"decalqul'-the doxa or common sense.1?
This "copying off" means that the Ufdoxa is mixed with or
the same as the doxa; they resemble one another and are not
differentiated. The phenomenological concept of Urdoxa has
violated therefore the most basic principle of Deleuze's
thought, perhaps the most basic principle of thought itself:
"The foundation can never resemble the founded." Deleuze
continues, "It is not enough to say about the foundation that
it is another history-it is also anothergeograp0', without being
another world."18 For Deleuze, the earth is a profound spati-
ality, consisting in "un ecart infime, mais invint'ible."
Conclusion: Memory and Life
The critique of phenomenology found in Foucault and
Derrida, as weil as in Deleuze, is based in this miniscule hia-
tus. Despite the fact that all three-Derrida, Deleuze, and
Foucault-share the same critique, there is a difference be-
tween them. To conclude, I am going to outline the differ-
ence between Derrida and Foucault. For both, the critique of
phenomenologicallived-experience is a critique of auto-af-
fection. The critique depends entirely on one necessary pos-
sibility: wherever the.re is sensing, it must be possible for there
to be a surface, and, wherever there is a surface, it must be
possible for there to be space. This necessary possibility im-
plies that auto-affectiol1, being alone and therefore close to
oneself and unified with oneself, is always already virtually
double, distant fron1 oneself and divided. But-and this is an
34
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important "but," as we shall see in a moment-what divides
the "auto," spacing it and makll1g it double in Dem·da is media-
tion, Vergegenwärtigung. Derrida always conceives the "ecart
infime" through Vergegenwärtigung, re-presentation. In Derrida,
re-presentation contaminates presentation; mediation, in other
words, contaminates the immediate, hut contamination is stillme-
diation. Thus, understood as mediation, contamination prom-
ises unity, even tllough it cannot, by necessity, ever keep this
promise. The other is always already close by and coming,
without ever arriving. Without ever being able to arrive, the
one who is going to keep the promise is to come in person (in
the flesh, Leiblich). Therefore, we must characterize Derrida's
critique of phenomenology (as he himself has done) as an
eJchatologülJl critique. It is a critique based in a promised unity
that demands to be done over again and again.19
Like that of Derrida, Foucault's critique too depends
entirely on one necessary possibility: wherever these is sens-
ing, it must be possible for there to be a surface, al~d, wher-
ever there is a surface, it must be possible for there to be space.
This necessary possibility implies that auto-affection, being
alone and therefore close to oneself and unified with oneself,
is always already virtually double, distant from oneself and
divided. .But-and this is where we see the difference from
Derrida-what divides the auto, spacing it and making it double
in ~oul'ault is a battle.20 Foucault conceives the "etlJrt injime" as
a battle. The opponents il~ the battle are words and things, or
hearing and seeing. The battle consists in attacks and cross-
ings across the surface (entrecroisements), but these attacks do not
.form a unity. No unity is ever promised in the battle. Politics,
wluch looks to be peace, as Foucault pointed out in Surveiller et
punir, is war being fought with other means. For Foucault, the
audio-visual battle is an immediate relation. There is no me-
diation because the opponents are can never be mixed to-
gether, or, we might say, can never contaminate one another.
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Instead, the opponents are posited as such; there is always the
opposition of resistant'e. Therefore, we must eharaeterize
Foueault's eritique of phenomenology (as he himself has done)
as apOJitivistic eritique.21 It is a eritique based in a duality with-
out negation and thus it is entirely positive.22
What are we to make of the clifference in their critiques?
We must return onee more to Chapter Nine of Les Mots et fes
choses, "Man and his Doubles." Here, Foucault had laid out a
kind of genealogy of phenomenology. At the beginning of
the nineteenth eentury, he tells us, tl1.ere was a dissoeiation in
the double sense of fmitude, between empirieal eontent and
foundational forms of knowledge. This dissoeiation was
Kant's thought. The dissociation, however, led to what Fou-
eault calls a transcendental aesthetics (the empirieal eontent)
and a transeendental clialeetie (the foundational forms). The
transeendental aestheties beeame positivism; the transeendental
dialeetic became esehatology. During the nineteenth eentury
and at the beginning of the twentieth century, this dissocia-
rion between positivism and esehatology eame to be associ-
ated in two ways: Marxism and phenomenology. We can see
the assoeiation in Marxism insofar as 1vfarxism claimed to give
the positive truth of man in eonditions of labor and at the
same time promised a revolutionary utopia. We can see this
assoeiation in phenomenology insofar as phenomenology
speaks of the eontent of Erlebnis, which can be positively de-
scribed as the truth, and at the same time of the fulfillment of a
meaning-intention, in other words, the promise of fulfilled
truth. For Foucault, this assoeiation leads to the ambiguity
that defmes both Marxism and phenomenology. N ow it seems
to me that, in their similar but different eritiques of phenom-
enology, Foueault and Derrida have onee again dissoeiated
positivism and eschatology. The association that phenomenol-
ogy and Marxism made has become unraveled. The doubles
that eame to be the ambiguity of Husserl's thought, positiv-
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ism and eschatology, have now themselves become dissoci-
ated into the thought of Foucault and Derrida. On the one
hand, we have Derrida's messianism, wh.ich leaps back to the
eschatology oE the nineteenth century. On the other hand,
we have Foucault's "fortunate positivism" (un positiviJme
hcurcux),23 which obviollsly leaps back to the positivism of the
nineteenth centu.ry. Foucault and Derrida have dissociated
immanence and transcendence, Eaith and knowledge, and, we
might even say, the heart and the brain. Both the brain and
the heart are complicated spaces; we might even appropriate
Heidegger's term ''Auseinander' in order to conceive them. Yet,
without the heart, one could not speak oE life; and without
the brain one could not speak of memory. Now we can see
what to make oE the difference between th.e critiques of
phenom-enology that we [md in Foucault and Derrida. This
is our task. We must continue the overcoming of metaphys-
ics by trying to find a new way oE associating the heart and the
brain. In other words, is it possible for us to :find a new distri-
bution, a new ''partage,'' as either Derrida or Foucault would
say, between the double oE the heart al1d the bram? Perhaps
this new partitioning can be found only under the heading of
"memory and life."24
UnilJersity oj' Memphis
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